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AbstrAct
background Doctors sometimes encounter parents who 
object to prescribed treatment for their children, and request 
suboptimal substitutes be administered instead (suboptimal 
being defined as less effective and/or more expensive). 
Previous studies have focused on parental refusal of 
treatment and when this should be permitted, but the ethics 
of requests for suboptimal treatment has not been explored.
Methods The paper consists of two parts: an empirical 
analysis and an ethical analysis. We performed an online 
survey with a sample of the general public to assess 
respondents’ thresholds for acceptable harm and expense 
resulting from parental choice, and the role that religion 
played in their judgement. We also identified and applied 
existing ethical frameworks to the case described in the 
survey to compare theoretical and empirical results.
results Two hundred and forty-two Mechanical Turk 
workers took our survey and there were 178 valid 
responses (73.6%). Respondents’ agreement to provide 
treatment decreased as the risk or cost of the requested 
substitute increased (p<0.001). More than 50% of 
participants were prepared to provide treatment that 
would involve a small absolute increased risk of death 
for the child (<5%) and a cost increase of US$<500, 
respectively. Religiously motivated requests were 
significantly more likely to be allowed (p<0.001). Existing 
ethical frameworks largely yielded ambiguous results for 
the case. There were clear inconsistencies between the 
theoretical and empirical results.
conclusion Drawing on both survey results and ethical 
analysis, we propose a potential model and thresholds 
for deciding about the permissibility of suboptimal 
treatment requests.
IntroductIon
Patients’ opinions, beliefs and values hold an 
important place in clinical decision making in 
modern medicine.1 A competent patient may refuse 
treatment for themselves on religious or non-re-
ligious grounds and a doctor must respect this 
decision, even if they consider it to be irrational.2 
However, this is more complicated when the indi-
vidual is making decisions on behalf of another (eg, 
a parent making treatment decisions for their child). 
Parents’ right to make medical treatment decisions 
on behalf of their child is not unlimited.3
There has been research into the ethics of 
parental refusal of treatment, for example, Jeho-
vah’s Witness parents who refuse a blood transfu-
sion for their children. In cases where the life of 
the child is at risk, it is widely accepted that doctors 
should over-ride parents’ wishes.3 But the question 
of what doctors should do when parents are not 
refusing treatment, rather requesting a substitute 
‘second best’ treatment, has attracted less attention. 
Box 1 describes a paradigm example of such a case.
Previous empirical research indicates that profes-
sionals are unsure how to respond to parental 
choice around treatments in cases like the one 
described in box 1. Two surveys of UK and US 
doctors indicated that professionals did not usually 
discuss the constituents of surfactant replacement 
with parents of premature newborns.4 5 However, 
in another survey, when asked from the perspective 
of a parent, a majority of medical and non-medical 
staff (74%) wanted the different types of surfactant 
replacement to be discussed before administration 
and 79% said that the hospital should stock at least 
one substitute preparation.6
Numerous pressing ethical questions emerge 
from cases like this. First, is it permissible for 
parents to choose substitute medical treatments 
that are less effective than those recommended by 
doctors? If so, how much less effective? Second, is it 
permissible in a public healthcare system for parents 
to choose more expensive medical treatments than 
those recommended by doctors? If so, what addi-
tional cost is acceptable? And third, does the reason 
behind the parents’ choice make a difference?
Normative models have been developed that 
can be used to assess whether or not it is justi-
fied for a physician to over-ride parents’ medical 
decision making for their child.7–9 However, 
these models have not been specifically applied to 
requests for suboptimal treatment.
The aim of this study was to explore the boundaries 
of parental choice and identify thresholds of accept-
able levels of harm and cost using both empirical and 
theoretical methods. In the first part of the paper we 
perform an empirical test of the general public’s intu-
itions about permissible levels of harm and expense 
caused by parental choice. In the second part of the 
paper we discuss existing ethical frameworks and 
compare and contrast the data gathered from our 
survey with the suggestions offered by ethical theory 
to aim at reflective equilibrium.
PArt 1: EMPIrIcAl AnAlysIs
Methods
Participants and procedure
American participants (n=242) were recruited 
online through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
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Figure 1 Flow chart of survey structure (see full survey; Appendix A). SRT, surfactant replacement therapy.
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and paid $1 for their time. MTurk is a website that facilitates 
payment for completing Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) posted 
by researchers, and is widely used in social science research 
because it provides participants who vary in age, socioeconomic 
status and ethnic background10 and are broadly representative of 
the US population. A power analysis revealed that a minimum 
of 128 participants was required to detect a moderate effect size 
(d=0.5) at the 5% level with 80% chance. Participants were 
excluded from data analysis if they failed to complete the survey 
(n=33) or failed a simple attention check11 (n=31). Thus, our 
final sample used in analysis consisted of 178 participants.
Participants completed the study through the online survey 
tool Qualtrics. The survey was piloted for face validity with a 
cohort of students and colleagues, and the order of the ques-
tions within all sections was randomised to reduce order effect.12 
Ethics approval for this study was provided by the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee of 
the University of Oxford.
Design
We hypothesised that when faced with a request for a substitute 
medical treatment, members of the public would be increasingly 
inclined to refuse parents’ requests as the comparative efficacy 
decreases, and as the expense increases. We predicted that survey 
respondents would be more likely to allow requests based on 
religious rather than non-religious reasons.
Sections 1 and 2
The first two sections of the study had a mixed-subjects design: 
a between-subjects factor of whether the reasons for requesting 
the substitute treatment were ‘religious’ or ‘ethical’; and a with-
in-subjects factor of whether this treatment was less efficacious 
or more expensive (figure 1).
Respondents were asked to imagine themselves as health 
professionals facing a request for substitute treatment (using the 
example of surfactant replacement). Participants were informed 
that without treatment the infant was stated to have a 30% 
absolute risk of mortality, and with the standard form of treat-
ment this risk was reduced to 15% (these figures were based 
on data13 on the effectiveness of surfactant replacement therapy, 
but slightly exaggerated and simplified for the sake of clarity). 
Respondents were randomised to receive one of two versions of 
these sections of the survey; 50% were told the parents’ reason 
for objecting was ‘religious’ and the other 50% were told the 
parents’ reason for objecting was ‘ethical.’
To look at the influence of efficacy and expense on support 
for substitute treatments, we asked participants to respond to a 
series of variations of the case example. First, participants were 
told that the hypothetical parents had either refused treatment 
or had requested treatments with varying degrees of reduced 
efficacy. The substitute treatments had a higher risk of pneumo-
thorax needing drainage (higher risk of a painful procedure), 
intraventricular haemorrhage (higher risk of disability) or of 
death (4%, 9% or 14% absolute increase in risk: see figure 2A). 
Next, participants were told that the substitute treatments 
requested were equally effective, but associated with varying 
degrees of additional cost (see figure 2B). To provide context 
for the cost of treatment, indicative examples were provided of 
other medical treatments with similar expense.14 Respondents 
were asked to indicate their level of agreement with allowing 
these parental requests on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree).
Section 3
This part of the study assessed all participants’ agreement to 
different reasons behind parental requests. There were five 
versions in a within-subjects design presented to all participants: 
three religious reasons for objection (Muslim, Christian and 
Jewish parents) and two non-religious reasons (vegan parents 
and parents with an irrational fear their child will develop an 
allergy to the medication). For each, respondents were asked 
whether they would agree to provide either a less effective 
Box 1 An example request for substitute suboptimal 
treatment. (A substitute treatment is defined as suboptimal 
if it is less effective and/or more costly than the standard 
treatment)
A very premature baby has just been born. The neonate is seriously 
ill and in intensive care with respiratory distress syndrome (RDS), a 
common complication of prematurity40 41 caused by a deficiency of 
surfactant. Surfactant replacement therapy (SRT) is a highly effective 
treatment for RDS, which reduces the risk of air leak, pneumothorax, 
pulmonary interstitial emphysema, bronchopulmonary dysplasia 
and neonatal mortality.13 However, the parents of this child have 
an objection to the prescribed medication because they are Muslim 
and the medication contains pork-derived ingredients which they 
consider haram (forbidden by Allah).42 (This medication may also 
receive objections from Jewish parents,43 as well as parents who 
are vegetarian, vegan or have an interest in animal rights.44) The 
parents have requested a substitute preparation of surfactant. 
There is a bovine-derived surfactant preparation which is both less 
effective39 45 and more expensive,38 and a synthetic preparation 
which may potentially be equally effective46 47 but is significantly 
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Figure 2 (A) Sample question from the survey, investigating willingness to provide less effective treatment. (B) Sample 
question from the survey, investigating willingness to provide more expensive treatment.
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substitute (with a higher, but unspecified chance of death) or 
a more expensive substitute (double the cost of the standard 
treatment).
Section 4
In order to allow comparison between requests for suboptimal 
treatment and other examples of parental discretion around 
treatment, the fourth part of the survey assessed respondents’ 
willingness to accede to two other widely discussed controver-
sial parental requests. They were asked if they would agree to 
prolong treatment deemed futile by medical professionals, or 
allow parents to decline a blood transfusion in a severely anaemic 
child. For each case, the respondents were provided with two 
versions, one where the parents’ request was based on a religious 
reason and the other on a non-religious reason.
Section 5
Finally, to look at how beliefs about the acceptability of subop-
timal treatments might differ across different groups, we collected 
basic demographic information. Given that some of the reasons 
the hypothetical parents gave for refusing treatment were reli-
gious ones, we measured how religious participants considered 
themselves using the Central Religiosity Scale (CRS).15 The CRS 
(α=0.93) consists of five items tapping different dimensions of 
religious belief (eg, private practice, public practice and religious 
experience). Similarly, because some of the reasons the hypo-
thetical parents gave were based on ethical views relating to the 
use of animals, we measured participants’ concern with animal 
welfare using an 8-itemed Speciesism Scalei (α=0.87).
i Caviola, L., Everett, J. A. C., Mannino, A., & Faber, N. S. (2016), 
manuscript in preparation.
Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS Statistics V.22 
for Windows (IBM). Paired samples t-tests were used to compare 
the participants’ responses between questions. Independent 
samples t-tests were used to investigate the differences between 
the participants given religious-based requests and those given 




The majority of the respondents were between 25 and 34 years 
old, and there were more female participants (Appendix B). 
Forty-one per cent had a tertiary education and three quarters of 
respondents were employed. All resided in the USA, but nearly 
40% originated elsewhere. Just over half of the cohort had a reli-
gious affiliation (the most common religion was Christianity), 
while over a third considered themselves atheists. The CRS 
showed approximately half of the cohort to be ‘Religious’ or 
‘Highly Religious’ (Appendix C). Eighty per cent had no dietary 
preference.
sections 1 and 2
When given scenarios of parents requesting less effective treat-
ment, the majority of respondents agreed to provide substitute 
treatment with a small increased mortality risk (19% abso-
lute mortality risk). Participants were less inclined to provide 
treatment that would increase a child’s risk of disability (mean 
agreement score (M)=3.66, SD=1.95) compared with a treat-
ment that would increase the risk of pain (M=4.12, SD=1.91) 
(t(177)=4.78, p<0.001), indicating that participants were more 
concerned about whether the treatment would cause disability 
than whether it would cause pain (figure 3). Participants were 
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Figure 3 Level of agreement to provide no treatment or substitute treatments of reduced efficacy.
Figure 4 Level of agreement to provide alternative treatments of increased expense.
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significantly less likely to provide treatment as the increased abso-
lute risk of death from the substitute treatment went from small 
(+4%) to medium (+9%) to large (+14%) (F(2,354)=37.94, 
p<0.001).
Twenty-eight per cent of respondents strongly agreed or 
agreed to allow parental refusal of treatment (30% absolute 
mortality, M=3.8, SD=2.04). Of note, this was higher than the 
level of agreement to provide a substitute treatment associated 
with a large increased risk of death (lower risk than that of no 
treatment; 29% absolute mortality risk; 26% agreed or strongly 
agreed, M=3.51, SD=2.08, t(177)=2.52, p<0.05).
Many participants agreed or strongly agreed with providing 
treatment that added $100 (45%) or $500 (35%) to the original 
$400 treatment. Respondents were less inclined to agree as the 
cost of the substitute treatment increased (F(5,885)=121.79, 
p<0.001) (figure 4). A large proportion of respondents disagreed 
or strongly disagreed with providing substitute treatments that 
cost an additional $100 000 (59%) or $1 000 000 (66%).
Next, we looked at how participants’ support for substitute 
treatments varied based on whether the reason behind the 
parents’ request was religious or ethical (non-religious). Results 
showed that, overall, participants were more inclined to allow 
parental requests when given a religious reason; though the 
difference was only statistically significant for the three substi-
tute treatment requests that had an increased risk of death (small 
risk, t(176)=2.32, p=0.02; medium risk, t(176)=2.01, p=0.05; 
large risk, t(176)=2.39, p=0.02) (Appendix D).
section 3
In a fully within-subjects design, respondents were presented 
with three religious and two non-religious reasons for parents 
requesting either a less effective substitute treatment or a 
more expensive treatment. A repeated measures analysis of 
variance revealed the main effects of both the reason for the 
request (F(4,708)=50.46, p<0.001) and the type of treatment 
(F(1,177)=52.63, p<0.001) on how much participants endorsed 
the substitute treatment, though there was no interaction effect 
between the two (F(4,708)=1.23, p=0.30). That is, participants 
were more willing to agree with a request for substitute treat-
ment when this was based on religious (vs non-religious) reasons 
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Figure 5 Level of agreement to provide substitute treatments of reduced efficacy (A) and increased expense (B) when 
requested for varying reasons.
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(see figure 5), and when the substitute treatment was more 
expensive (vs having a higher side effect of death). Looking only 
at the category of non-religious reasons, participants were more 
willing to provide treatment at the request of vegan parents 
compared with parents with an irrational belief for both the less 
effective substitute (t(177)=4.20, p<0.001) and for the more 
expensive substitute (t(177)=4.72, p<0.001) (see figure 5A,B 
and Appendices E and F).
section 4
Finally, we looked at how participants’ judged requests for treat-
ments based on religious versus non-religious reasons in the two 
contexts of prolonging futile treatment and refusing a blood 
transfusion. Participants did not differ in their endorsement 
of prolonging futile treatment based on whether this request 
was based on religious (M=5.01, SD=1.66) or non-religious 
(M=4.99, SD=1.66) reasons (t(177)=0.46, p=0.64). However, 
participants were less willing to agree with a request to refuse 
a blood transfusion for religious reasons (M=4.08, SD=2.11) 
compared with non-religious reasons (M=4.35, SD=2.05) 
(t(177)=3.12, p=0.002) (Appendix G).
section 5
There was no association between participants’ responses to 
the survey and their age, gender, employment status, ethnicity, 
whether they had children or their response to the Specie-
sism Scale. A weak association was found in results between 
responses and levels of education. Participants with a higher 
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level of education indicated lower levels of agreement to 
provide substitute requested treatment associated with a small 
increased risk of death or to provide treatment for vegan 
parents.
Overall, highly religious participants had higher agreement 
scores than not religious participants (ie, were more likely to 
agree to provide treatment substitutes) for all scenarios except 
for the blood transfusion refusal scenario, but these differences 
were not statistically significantii (Appendix H).
dIscussIon
To our knowledge, this is the first study to gauge the attitudes 
of the general public towards parental refusal of treatment or 
requests for substitute treatment on behalf of their children. 
Participants were presented with substitute treatments of varying 
efficacy and cost, and different reasons for parental requests. 
Many of those surveyed were prepared to support parental 
refusal of treatment or request for less effective treatment even 
where this would increase a child’s risk of dying or of disability. 
Participants were more likely to refuse requests for substi-
tutes as the efficacy of the substitute fell, or its cost increased. 
Respondents were more inclined to agree if provided with a 
religious reason for parents’ request compared with a non-re-
ligious reason. Responses were not influenced by age, gender, 
employment status, whether respondents had children, dietary 
preference or ethnicity. We defined a ‘threshold’ for approval 
as the point at which the majority of respondents agreed to a 
parental request. In our survey, requests for substitute treatments 
with a small increased risk of death (<5%) were supported 
by a majority. The cost threshold sat at an additional cost of 
$100–$500.
The findings of the study were consistent with our hypotheses. 
As the absolute risk of death associated with substitute treat-
ments increased, the percentage of respondents who strongly 
disagreed or (simply) disagreed to allow the request increased 
significantly. This finding fits with an assessment that the balance 
of interests tips in the child’s favour as the risk of harm or death 
becomes greater; consequently it becomes more reasonable to 
over-rule parental requests.
Participants were less likely to allow a substitute that increased 
a risk of disability than one that increased a risk of pain, 
reflecting the reasonable assessment that long-term disability is 
a more serious harm.
Overall, although some differences were statistically signif-
icant, respondents’ opinions in our survey were divided 
between agreement and disagreement for all questions. Even 
for the most serious risks (disability and a large increased 
risk of death), a relatively large proportion of the cohort 
supported parents’ request, showing a striking willingness 
to allow parents to make decisions that risked harm to their 
children. Nearly a third of all participants agreed or strongly 
agreed to a parental refusal of treatment that would result 
in a 15% increase in the absolute risk of mortality. This is 
notably different from norms in clinical practice. In a survey 
of 957 American oncologists,16 over 80% found it unaccept-
able to allow parents to refuse chemotherapy for children with 
moderate to good prognosis.
Paradoxically, there was higher agreement to allow parents to 
refuse treatment (30% absolute mortality risk) than to provide 
ii The middle category,‘Religious' (N=62), was not included in this 
analysis.
a substitute, but relatively ineffective treatment (29% absolute 
mortality risk). Perhaps participants intuitively distinguished 
between an act and an omission, and were less willing to allow 
parents to request a medication (a positive right) than to refuse 
treatment (a negative right) which is a more familiar aspect of 
clinical practice.17 Alternatively, it is possible that participants 
simply did not make a logical connection between the two ques-
tions, or that responses were impacted by respondents’ difficul-
ties in understanding statistical risk18 19
A clearer relationship was evident for the questions relating 
to expense than efficacy; there was a strong negative correlation 
between additional cost requested and agreement. One possible 
explanation for this is that intervals in cost may be easier to 
understand and more intuitively comparable than the intervals 
in efficacy. A small proportion of respondents were prepared 
to support parental requests for treatment substitutes even at 
considerable excessive cost.
As anticipated, the results showed religiously motivated 
requests to be met with higher agreement. This apparent bias 
towards religion could be because religion has a higher status 
in society than other personal beliefs (such as dietary prefer-
ences for ethical reasons), reflected in the legal or constitutional 
protection of religion in the USA,20 Australia,21 Europe22 and 
many other countries. However, a religiously motivated parental 
refusal of blood transfusion had a lower agreement score than a 
non-religion-based refusal (this was true of all participants, irre-
spective of religiosity). It is possible that participants had pre-ex-
isting negative judgements of Jehovah’s Witnesses, or believed 
the risk of blood-borne infections (the non-religious reason) to 
be more serious or plausible.
The religiosity of the respondents was not significantly 
correlated with higher agreement to religion-based requests. 
This differed from other studies23 24 that have shown a physi-
cian’s religious preferences to influence her decision making. A 
survey of 446 US physicians25 showed that physicians with high 
religiosity were substantially more likely to refuse a request they 
considered morally wrong. However, many of these studies are 
about end-of-life care, a matter intrinsically linked to religious 
morality, where the decision may more directly relate to the 
physician’s personal religious beliefs.
limitations
We deliberately sought the views of the general community, 
however, it is possible that parents of children with medical prob-
lems, or health professionals would have a different response to 
scenarios. Participants were also asked to assume the role of the 
doctor and this artificial instruction may have influenced their 
responses.26
As is the case with all online experimentation, we could not 
control the participants’ experimental setting, and ecological 
validity cannot be assured.27 All MTurk experiments have the 
potential for respondents to give satisficing responses, or for 
software programs to automatically complete HITs.10 To counter 
this, an attention check was added and inadequate responses 
removed. Our sample had sufficient statistical power to detect 
a modest effect in the primary analysis. However, it was not 
powered to detect small subgroup differences, and with a larger 
sample, the participants could have been stratified by religious 
affiliation or religiosity to compare the results more thoroughly. 
All participants were from the USA and thus responses may 
reflect local, cultural and religious values, particularly their 
opinion of the role of a public healthcare system and how it 
ought to allocate its resources. While MTurk respondents have 
previously been shown to be broadly representative of the US 
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‘Acting to promote maximally the good of the individual (the child)’
• The state can over-ride the parents’ authority if the child has suffered or is in danger of suffering serious harm
• Once that threshold is met, the state must decide on the course of action considering the child’s best interests
Harm Principle
Diekema7
Health professionals can seek state intervention if:
• The parents’ decision significantly increases the risk of harm
• The harm is imminent
• The refused intervention is necessary to prevent the harm
• The refused intervention is of proven efficacy
• The projected benefit to burden ratio of the refused intervention is significantly more favourable compared with that of the parents’ 
preferred option
• No alternative would prevent harm and be more acceptable to the parents
• Most parents would agree that state intervention was reasonable
The Not Unreasonable Standard
Rhodes and Holzman31
Assess the appropriateness of the decision makers and assess the appropriateness of the decision itself
• Centre core judgement: one that is universally made and cannot be reasonably rejected
• Second domain judgement: one that is prioritised differently by reasonable people
• Third domain judgement: one that can be reasonably rejected
An idiosyncratic reason can only be accepted when a patient makes a decision for themselves, not when a surrogate makes a decision (eg, 
parents). ‘Only decisions based on universal reasons are acceptable for surrogate refusal of highly beneficial treatment.’
Balance of Cost and Benefits
DeMarco et al32
An economic theory which balances:
• Cost of treatment for the patient
• Benefit of treatment for the patient
• Costs borne by others as a result of the treatment
Zone of Parental Discretion
Gillam and Kilham et al29 50
A practical tool which denotes an ‘ethically and legally protected space’ in which parents are allowed to make decisions for their children. 
It considers:
• The Harm Principle (see above)
• The burdensomeness of the intervention
Compares the expected harms of acceding to the parents’ wishes with the harms involved in over-riding the parents’ wishes
table 2 The solutions provided by the theoretical frameworks for 
over-riding parental decisions, applied to a request for a substitute 
form of surfactant replacement therapy
Framework status of request
Best Interests Standard Denied
Harm Principle Unclear
Not Unreasonable Standard Unclear
Balance of Costs and Benefits Unclear
Zone of Parental Discretion Unclear
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population, our survey respondents had a relatively high propor-
tion of educated, female respondents, and results may not be 
generalisable to other populations and settings. Finally, our 
quantitative study was not able to explore the reason behind the 
respondents’ choices.
PArt 2: EthIcAl AnAlysIs
Our data show how some members of the general public respond 
to hypothetical cases of parental requests for substitute medical 
treatment, but how should we respond? A detailed theoretical 
analysis is beyond the scope of the paper, however, as a starting 
point we draw on a recently published systematic review.9 We 
summarise several existing ethical frameworks that have been 
used to decide about parents’ medical decision making for their 
child and apply them to the clinical scenario summarised at the 
start of this paper (box 1). We compare empirical findings to 
theory, with the goal of achieving coherence between ethical 
principles and data gathered of people’s beliefs and intuitions, 
working towards wide reflective equilibrium.28 We will propose 
a preliminary framework building on this analysis.
Several normative models have previously been proposed to 
assess whether or not it is justified for a physician to over-ride 
parents’ medical decision making for their child. McDougall 
and Notini, in a recent paper, identified nine different frame-
works.9 Table 1 summarises a subset of the most relevant of these 
frameworks and includes another, more recent, one which deals 
explicitly with parental requests as well as refusals.29
Applying these frameworks to the case example yields varying 
outcomes (table 2). A strict interpretation of the Best Inter-
ests Standard would mean denying any parental request for a 
less effective treatment.30 It is not clear whether this standard 
would permit more expensive (but equally effective) substi-
tutes. However, other frameworks did not yield a clear answer 
to whether parents should be permitted to choose suboptimal 
substitute treatment. Although Rhodes and Holzman’s ‘Not 
Unreasonable Standard’31 classifies beliefs held by only subgroups 
of the population (such as religion) as third domain judgements 
which can be reasonably rejected (table 1), the authors argue 
that parents’ decisions should only be over-ruled if the prog-
nosis is poor; and it is unclear how poor that prognosis must 
be. DeMarco et al’s ‘Balance of Costs and Benefits’ framework32 
does not state how one ought to weigh the costs and benefits of 
treatment to come to a decision. Diekema’s Harm Principle and 
Gillam’s Zone of Parental Discretion appear to map most closely 
onto current clinical decision makingiii but do not clearly state 
what constitutes a ‘significant risk’ or a ‘serious harm’ and thus 
fail to yield a clear answer.
Where should we draw the line on parental requests for substi-
tute medical treatment? There is no clear theoretical answer to 
iii This is not to say that current clinical practice is necessarily correct, 
however it is important to compare suggestions offered by theoretical 
frameworks to existing guidelines and practice.
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table 3 Potential harm thresholds for allowing parents to choose less effective treatment
severity of harm Example harms Example case




Refusing a vitamin K injection for a newborn could lead to clotting and has an 





Refusing a complete surgical repair of a broken leg (because it requires a blood 
transfusion) and instead opting for an incomplete repair, increasing the need for 
additional surgeries and the risk of surgical complications51
Medium <15%
Small Somewhat painful procedure
Slightly increased length of illness
Refusing antibiotics for an ear infection may lengthen the duration of the 
illness52
Large <50%
Trivial Very short-lasting pain Ear piercing causes mild pain that quickly resolves53 Certain 100%
Clinical ethics
this question. Although empirical surveys do not settle the ques-
tion either, the intuitions of the general public provide a poten-
tial starting point for achieving coherence between intuitions 
and theory using the reflective equilibrium.28 Empirical evidence 
that is inconsistent with one’s position should encourage further 
analysis, and re-evaluation of previous reasoning. For example, 
if the general public believe that a 5% risk of death is acceptable, 
yet an ethicist may only accept 0.01%, this says that the general 
public value parental autonomy more than the ethicist. The ethi-
cist ought to assess the value of parental autonomy and consider 
what arguments could justify raising the threshold above 0.01%, 
even though those arguments might not support going all the 
way to 5%. That is, the empirical evidence causes us to recon-
sider arguments and reasons, and perhaps choose another point 
within a justifiable options space.
There are some apparent inconsistencies between the ethical 
frameworks and the results of our empirical survey. First, a 
significant proportion of our cohort judged it acceptable for 
parents to make decisions that were associated with serious 
risks for the child. Even if the frameworks are unclear about 
requests for less effective treatments, it seems that a 15% abso-
lute increase in the risk of death for a child (as was the case 
with an outright refusal of treatment) represents a significant 
risk of serious harm, and would not be supported by any of the 
models. Second, in our survey, there was a clear bias towards 
religious reasons and against non-religious ethical beliefs such 
as veganism. This appears to demonstrate discrimination against 
parents with sincere non-religious beliefs. However, ethicists 
have argued that patient or parent’s religion should not be 
considered a relevant difference when considering otherwise 
alike cases.29 33 Of the models described in table 1, only the ‘Not 
unreasonable framework’ makes a clear difference based on the 
reason behind parental requests. In that model, central core 
judgements provide an acceptable reason for parents to make 
requests for suboptimal treatment. In contrast to our survey 
findings, that framework suggests that a secular preference for 
non-animal-based treatment should be given more weight than 
a religious reason.
A majority of the general public surveyed were comfortable 
allowing parents to choose treatment that would result in up to 
a <5% increase in the absolute risk of death. If this were used as 
the threshold for over-ruling parental decisions, 20 parents (or 
fewer) would need to be over-ruled to prevent one death. Five 
per cent represents a statistical threshold often used in scien-
tific studies for judging low probability of error, as well as the 
threshold that some have argued should be applied to judgements 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in criminal prosecutions,34 however, 
some may regard 5% as still too high a level of risk to impose on a 
child for the sake of parental values. Other risks that children are 
subjected to by their parents, such as passive smoking or unsafe 
driving, would not increase risk of death by as much. The risk of 
death from driving in a year is approximately 1/10 000,35 and is 
universally regarded as an acceptable risk for parents to impose on 
their children. Perhaps the threshold should be set at 1%, 0.1% or 
0.01%? We cannot definitively answer that question here.
In fact, decision theory would suggest that there are two vari-
ables in setting a threshold level of harm: the severity of harm 
and the probability of this harm occurring.36 It may be reason-
able to allow a higher probability where the severity of the harm 
is less. If an expected harm approach (drawing on decision-theo-
retic consequentialism) is the correct approach to medical uncer-
tainty, we could extrapolate from the empirical results to create 
a set of potential harm thresholds to decide when a risk should 
be tolerated (table 3).
What cost would be acceptable for parental choice? The 
results of this study demonstrate a willingness to provide treat-
ment up to $500 more expensive at parental request. The 
plausibility of this threshold will depend on the availability of 
resources within a public health system. Very wealthy countries 
may be able to afford a higher amount, while countries that 
struggle to afford basic health services might decide to prohibit 
any parental choices that would be more costly. In practice, the 
$500 threshold would potentially rule out many substitute treat-
ments, since small differences in the efficacy of treatment could 
lead to additional medical costs including additional bed days or 
need for future medical interventions.
Wherever we set the threshold for more expensive treat-
ment, one option will be to permit parents to pay the excess 
cost of their preferred treatment. This would largely remove the 
ethical reason to decline parental request (assuming the treat-
ment was not more harmful), and we would propose this should 
be allowed. However, this option would conflict with strict 
egalitarian policies like those adopted in the National Health 
Service.37
How should doctors take into account the reasons behind 
parental requests? One option would be to vary thresholds 
for cost or harm depending on the reason. On this basis it 
may be ethical to allow a more harmful or more costly choice 
where parents are motivated by a particularly weighty reason. 
However, such variable thresholds might well be anticipated 
to lead to significant inconsistency in practice, as well as bias 
against certain groups due to physicians’ variable interpretation 
of the weightiness of reasons. On the other hand, it appears 
unacceptable to allow parents to choose suboptimal treatment 
for any reason whatsoever: parents should not be able to choose 
more harmful or more costly treatments for trivial or irrational 
reasons. In such cases, the cost borne by the child will outweigh 
the benefit gained by the parents, if any. (The latter might yield 
genuine questions about the competence of parents to make 
decisions for their child.)
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Figure 6 Reasonable-Choice Threshold Model for parental 
choice around treatment.
Clinical ethics
The Reasonable-Choice Threshold Model (figure 6) combines 
the above ethical conclusions into a model for arbitrating 
parental decisions around refusal of treatment or requests for 
suboptimal treatment.iv
In this model, the doctor should first assess the competency 
of the decision maker, next consider the acceptability of their 
reason and finally, if the reason is acceptable, the request should 
be subjected to fixed cost and harm thresholds. Which reasons are 
acceptable? Intuitively, those that are clearly articulated, moti-
vated by genuine concern for the child’s well-being, persistent 
and represent core values associated with long-standing tradition 
would be deemed acceptable by many, this may include religious 
values. However, secular reasons may also potentially fulfil these 
criteria, and the model should not discriminate between religious 
and non-religious adherents. A full articulation of the distinction 
between acceptable and unacceptable reasons requires further 
research and lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Applying the Reasonable-Choice Threshold Model to our 
case from the beginning of this paper (box 1) yields the conclu-
sion that the parents’ request should arguably be permitted. 
We did not provide information about parents’ competence to 
decide, but this may be assumed for the sake of argument. Is 
the reason acceptable? Islam is a well-established religion with 
many millions of followers practising the same customs for thou-
sands of years. Respect for the large number of adherents and 
longevity of the tradition would arguably make such a reason 
acceptable. The request must then be subjected to the cost and 
harm thresholds. There are relatively little contemporary data 
on the relevant costs of surfactant therapy, however, one study 
comparing the costs of acquisition, administration and adverse 
events found beractant (bovine) to be $493 more expensive than 
poractant alfa (porcine)38; on the model above it sits just below 
the cost threshold. Is the level of harm acceptable? Focusing 
just on the most serious risk—that of death, the absolute risk 
reduction in mortality associated with poractant alfa is 6.4% and 
iv The model is derived from analysis of the ethical considerations at 
stake in decisions about substitute treatment, as well as review of theo-
retical models previously published. This generated a set of normative 
conclusions that form the foundation of the model: Parents’ requests for 
suboptimal treatments should be rejected if the parents are not compe-
tent to decide, or the reasons appear trivial or irrational; requests for 
suboptimal treatment may be permissible if the additional cost to the 
public health system is not excessive, and if the harm caused to the child 
is not excessive.
beractant is 10.9%,39 which is about a 4.5% absolute increase 
and sits below the harm threshold as set out in table 3.
conclusIons
This study has explored the boundaries of parental choice in 
medical decision making for children. Expanding medical possi-
bilities, expanding access to information and increasing diversity 
of values in society are likely to lead to more situations where 
parents request treatment that differs from those recommended 
by health professionals. It will be important to determine when 
such requests should be accepted, and when they should not.
Our study brings together empirical research and ethical anal-
ysis. As noted above, the empirical findings may not be gener-
alisable to other populations, and a repeat survey in a group 
with different values or norms might yield significantly different 
thresholds. Endorsement of a particular view by the general 
public does not necessarily mean this is the ethically correct 
approach. Where a process of wide reflective equilibrium iden-
tifies a conflict between ethical theory and the intuitions of the 
general public, it may be appropriate either to reconsider or 
modify the theory, or to reject the intuitions. However, it is not 
always clear which course to take.
Our survey sample appeared to have intuitions which were 
most consistent with the Harm Model or Zone of Parental 
Discretion. They were inconsistent with the Best Interests Stan-
dard which officially governs medical ethics and practice.
We have outlined one potential model for arbitrating decisions 
about suboptimal treatment, and drawn on our empirical work 
to suggest some potential harm and cost thresholds as a starting 
point for debate. An expected harm approach which considers 
both magnitude and probability of harm is a promising approach 
which appears consistent with public intuition. Further empir-
ical study, including qualitative research, is necessary to help test 
our proposed model against other medical decisions, and assess 
the views of stakeholders, including medical professionals, about 
it. Further ethical research will also be crucial, in particular to 
address the difficult question of the acceptability of different 
reasons underlying parental choice.
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